Welcome to BASE21

written by Kim Chun-Sam (PICIS, South Korea)

The international community has probably come into contact with news from South Korea over the mainstream media during the past several years concerning two main events: the financial crisis in late 97 and early 98, which swept through not only South Korea but most of East Asia as well, and the recent summit meetings between North and South Korea, followed up by coverage of reunions between separated families. The tone for the international coverage of the former event shifted from that of anxiety at the near disaster to admiration at the 'miraculous' recovery. The latter was presented as the final chapter of the cold war, with South Korean president Kim Dae-Jung leading the way toward 'peace and reconciliation,' which, more recently, which was one of the main reasons for president Kim being rewarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

Such analysis of these events do hold partial truth. Main economic indicators due seem to suggest not only full recovery from the crisis, but a return to stable growth: the foreign exchange rate has stabilized, there has been a considerable improvement in the foreign reserve, the stock market has recovered, inflation is under control, and the growth rate is back in the positive. It is also true that tensions have subsided considerably since the series of talks between high ranking government officials from various sectors between the North and South, and that both countries have become relatively more 'accepting' of each other's societies: a departure from the prevalence of antagonism and distrust during the last 50 years after the Korean War.

However, such distorted, or selective to say the least, views on these events do not tell the whole story of what is taking place on the peninsula. Although capital and the government had previously attempted to introduce neo-liberal policies before the crisis, the IMF brought on the full-scale re-structuring program in exchange for its emergency relief package. The following 3 years after the IMF crisis have been an almost constant battle for the socially oppressed of Korea, in defense of basic labor rights that had been gained through years of struggle. Workers, farmers, the poor, as well as progressive activists have waged a constant battle against the combined efforts of international financial institutions, the government and corporations to put the structural adjustment programs into place, organizing several general strikes, countless demonstrations and struggles in solidarity with other social movements. Demands of the Korean Left have included reduction of working hours, expansion of social benefits, abolishment of the temporary employment system, job security, participation of trade unions in management decisions, guaranteed housing for the homeless and forcefully evicted, retraction of plans for privatization of the public sector, retraction of employment policies which relegate women to irregular and casual work, and many more. However, 3 years of the IMF's neo-liberal re-structuring program have resulted in the increasing dependency on foreign economies and international trends, increasing economic instability, lay-offs, unstable
jobs, rise in unemployment, the polarization of wealth, the dismantling of social unity, among many others: an overall and dramatic decrease in the standards of living for the people of Korea. The government is currently pushing ahead with the next stage of structural adjustment, announcing plans for further privatization and foreign sale of the public sector despite widespread opposition to the plans.
The dark side of the 'miracle recovery' which seems to have evaded the corporate media.

Reports on the prospects of reunification have been equally partial. Although the progressive sector of Korea remains divided on some key issues regarding the current trends between the North and South, it is generally agreed upon that the on-going exchanges have been almost completely capital-driven and as a result, have excluded any opinions held by progressive organizations on the relationship between the two systems and the agendas/issues which need to be resolved for true peace and reconciliation to take root on the peninsula.

This is partly due to the lethargic position the progressive sector showed throughout the initial summit talks and the ensuing exchanges. The Korean Left was just as surprised as the general public at the announcement of the meetings just before the General Elections in April, and the lack of a concrete plan to deal with the sudden change in the political state of affairs led to scattered and largely ineffective programs during the process. This, in turn, resulted with delicate but vital issues such as the presence of U.S. forces in Korea, the National Security Law(a law which bans any expression of political opinions or activities which the court interprets as being 'friendly to the North,' it has been used for decades by the regime in power to oppress the democratic movement and the labor movement: complete abolishment of this law has been a demand of the progressive movement for the
past 50 years), talks for disarmament and a peace treaty to replace the current cease-fire: which have long been demands of the progressive sector in Korea, being completely left out of the talks despite the many popular, on-going struggles in South Korea directly related to the system of division in the past few months.

The business sector, on the other hand, has been playing a central role in the exchanges. Hyundai, one of the 3 largest business conglomerates in South Korea, is at the forefront of the rush. Its founder and honorary chairman Chung Ju-yung, has even met with the leader of the North, Kim Jong-Il to discuss plans for economic development. Hyundai is responsible for the tourist operations of Mt. Kumgang(located in the eastern part of North Korea) and is currently involved with several major construction and manufacturing operations in various areas of the country. So called 'special economic zones' or 'free trade zones' have been set up to accomodate this flood of South Korean business in the North. Such zones are the result of the concurring needs of the two countries: the North would like to draw in foreign currency without a drastic changes in its political and economic system, and the South would like to use the cheap labor of the North, as well as establish a firm position in what it considers a potentially major new market in an effort to overturn falling profits. The free trade zones are a good example of what direction the overall exchanges with the North are taking. Hyundai insiders have even boasted that no labor disputes will occur with the situation in the North and that continued investments in the North are planned.

While capital has had almost no limitations in moving to the North, the exchanges among the civic, social, and people's movement sector have been severely restricted. This is reflective of the government's vision of the reunification process: On the basis of sustaining clear military superiority(thereby blocking the peace process), having capital play the leading role(thereby serving the interests of South Korean capital), and ultimately absorbing the North system into the neo-liberal capitalist economy of the South. All hidden beneath the spotlight being given to the smiles, handshakes, parades, and fancy dinners during the talks for 'peace and reconciliation'.

The system of division is one that has oppressed and exploited the people of both North and South Korea for the past 50 years and a peaceful and democratic reunification has long been the wish of the people of both Koreas. With the sudden improvements in the political conditions for reunification, an end to this system of hate and suppression finally seems to be in sight. It is clear that in the process of abolishing this system and building a new one, the movement for democratic change and the people's empowerment cannot be separate from the movement for reunification. It is critical that the people of Korea, as well as the world, realize the advances which are made in the democratic people's movement in the South will be the determining factor in just how much the improvements in the relationship between the two systems and reunification correspond with the people's interest of both countries.
What the people of Korea can gain, and defend, in the struggle for basic democratic rights, for the people's livelihood and political empowerment against the attack of capital and neo-liberal globalization, will have direct effects on what form the reunification process will take. The actions taken and decisions made by the progressive sector in the upcoming years will have lasting effects on the future of a united Korea.