Welcome to BASE21

By Moon J. Pak, M.D.

A group of Korean-Americans was in Pyongyang recently and had an interesting and informative opportunity to meet with some of North Korea's policy planners as well as the country's leaders at various levels, to hear directly and on a personal level their side of the story on the ever increasing downward spiraling of the international relationship between the US and the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea), due to the nuclear weapons issue.

Members of the group all had been to that country many times; some for religious mission effort, others for humanitarian medical assistance, food aid program, etc. They are united in a belief that by understanding the country of the DPRK based on the common cultural background, Korean-Americans could promote the process of reconciliation between the two countries.

It became clear to the visitors to North Korea that the country's resolve to go the nuclear pathway stems to a large extent, from their perception over the last several years, especially since the inception of the Bush administration, of the US noncompliance of the 1994 Agreed Framework signed in Geneva between the two countries. This, combined with the "Might is Right" attitude of the US administration manifested repeatedly by culturally offensive, undiplomatic statements disdainful of the country, and culminating in the now famous "Axis of Evil" statement by President Bush early this year, and finally appearing in the envoy Kelly's overbearing presentation at the Pyongyang meeting, has precipitated the current crisis.

Therefore, it was felt by some visitors of the group that by presenting each of the four articles of the '94 Agreed Framework in verbatim, and reviewing the historical status of the compliance by the two countries would be most useful for the American public in understanding the North Korea's current hard-line stance:

Agreed Framework Between The DPRK and The US
Geneva, October 21, 1994

Article one: Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor(LWR) power plants.

1) In accordance with the October 20, 1994, letter of assurance from the US president, the US will undertake to make arrangements for the provision to the DPRK of a LWR project with a total generating capacity of approximately 2,000 MW(e) by a target date of 2003.
2) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the US president, the US, representing the consortium (KEDO), will make arrangements to offset the energy forgone due to the freeze of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, pending completion of the first LWR unit.

--Alternative energy will be provided in the form of heavy oil for heating and electricity production. Deliveries of heavy oil will begin within three months of the date of this document and will reach a rate of 500,000 tons annually, in accordance with an agreed schedule of deliveries.

3) and 4) refers to DPRK's commitment to seal the fuel rods and freezing of its graphite-moderated reactors and subjecting themselves to the monitoring and inspection by the IAEA for the compliance and eventual dismantling of the reactors and disposition of the fuel rods upon completion of the LRW's-Until recently, of course the DPRK had been in full compliance of this part of the article.

Discussion:

The completion of the LWR has been delayed. The KEDO now projects four additional years of delay before the first of the two reactors will become operational, depriving the DPRK of its expectation of at least 1,000 MW(e) of energy beginning the next year (2003). It must be remembered that there has never been a delay in the provision of the needed funds coming from South Korea and Japan, as well as the technological support coming from South Korea. This constitutes a clear US noncompliance of the Agreement.

Heavy oil shipment that had been made contingent upon the US congressional approval had been coming until the last minute halting of this year's shipment by the US administration in November of this year.

The DPRK had been in full compliance with regard to the sealing of the fuel rods, freezing of the graphite-moderated reactors as well as allowing the on site IAEA monitoring until very recently when the current crisis occurred.

Article two: The two sides will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.

1) Within three months of the date of this document, both sides will reduce barriers to trade and investments, including restrictions on telecommunications services and financial transactions.
2) Each side will open a liaison office in the other's capital following resolution of consular and other technical issues through expert-level discussions.
3) As progress is made on issues of concern to each side, the DPRK and the US will upgrade bilateral relations to the ambassadorial level.

Discussion:

The US is in a complete, noncompliance with this article of the Agreement; the sanctions and embargo that are unprecedented in severity, compromising the DPRK effort for economic recovery, has not been lifted. The country has been repeatedly called "Rogue State" and continues to be listed among the "Terrorist States;" and no prospect for an establishment of a normal diplomatic relationship between the two countries has ever been offered by the US.

The US compliance with this article is very important to the DPRK in its effort to revamp and stabilize its socioeconomic structure and join the nations of the world. To the urgings of the Korean-American visitors to open up their country, the standard answer from them has always been that their door is locked from the outside.

Article Three: Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.

1) The US will provide formal assurance to the DPRK against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the US.
2) The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
3) The DPRK will engage in north-south dialogue, as this agreed framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes such dialogue.

Discussion:

This provision of the US formal assurance to the DPRK against the threat or use of its nuclear arsenal became meaningless and void when it was discovered that the US has established a secret plan, so called "Nuclear Posture Review" that targets the DPRK with nuclear weapons - a clear violation of this article by the US.

The recent DPRK admission to the envoy Kelly that they have intent or an actual facility to enrich Uranium is a clear violation of the spirit of the Denuclearization Declaration, although the Agreement refers to the fuel rod and graphite-moderated reactor product, indicating Plutonium. One however must not overlook the fact that action constitutes the reaction to the US record of noncompliance with the Agreement and their increasing security concern given the continued hostility manifested by the US.

With regard to clause 3), one must say that the DPRK had been in full compliance given the record of continued d�tente between South and North Koreas, in spite of official and unofficial disdain of the so called "Sunshine Policy" of South Korea by the Bush administration.

Article Four: Both sides will work together to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime.

1) The DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and will allow implementation of its safeguards agreement under the treaty.
2) Upon conclusion of the supply contract for the provision of the LWR project, ad hoc and routine inspections will resume under the DPRK's safeguard agreement with the IAEA with respect to the facilities not subject to freeze. Pending conclusion of the supply contract, inspections required by the IAEA for the continuity of safeguards will continue at the facilities not subject to the freeze.
3) When a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components, the DPRK will come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/403), including taking all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the agency with regard to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK.

Signed by Kang Sok Ju, Head of the Delegation of the DPRK, First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK

Signed by Robert L. Galluci, Head of the Delegation of the United States of America, Ambassador at Large of the USA

Discussion:

The DPRK had remained in the NPT and until the eruption of the current crisis had complied with its provisions. It may be relevant however to note at this point, the US has yet to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), raising questions about its future intent vis-�-vis nuclear proliferation.

With regard to the IAEA inspection, their staff had been stationed in Pyongyang monitoring the fuel rods and the reactors without any hindrance from the DPRK, until very recently when the current crisis continued to escalate.

The last clause (3) refers to a comprehensive IAEA inspection of the DPRK upon reaching the advanced stage completion of the LWR project, and thus currently remains a moot point due to the delay in the LWR project itself.

Conclusion and Recommendation:

Engagement, dialogue and negotiation among all the parties involved, especially between the US and the DPRK, is the only viable option. The starting point could be the re-examination of the 1994 Agreed Framework. To begin with, the US must expedite building of the two LWR's, and then provide the DPRK with a precise, realistic timetable for their completion. Also, the heavy oil supply should be resumed as specified by the Agreement. The US should also prepare a timetable for the normalization of the relationship with the DPRK, which should include gradual lifting of the sanctions and embargo. The DPRK on the other hand, must also prepare a timetable for dismantling of not only the Uranium enrichment facility but also Plutonium storage, including the nuclear weapons if any, and biological, chemical weapons of mass destruction. These timetables should be "Cross-Indexed" to proceed simultaneously and in a mutually verifiable manner.

To relieve the DPRK's security concern, thus enabling them to reduce heavy economic burden of the "Military-First Policy" and nuclear pathway, a non-aggression pact should be signed between the DPRK, the US and South Korea.

To fine-tune the relationship on a continued basis and coordinate the implementation of the above timetables, the US must establish a Liaison Office in Pyongyang, headed by a high, senior level presidential appointee, an individual whose status is such that he may be expected to be received by North Korea's highest leadership with confidence and respect.

Prepared by:

Moon J. Pak, M.D., Ph.D.
Chairman
Steering Committee
Korean-American League (KAL)

Chairman
US-DPRK Medical Science Exchange Committee